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MULTIPLE PETTY OFFENSES WITH SERIOUS
PENALTIES: A CASE FOR THE RIGHT TO
TRIAL BY JURY
Christine E. Pardo*
"I consider trial by jury as the only anchor ever yet imagined by
man, by which a government can be held to the principles of its
constitution." - Thomas Jefferson**
Introduction
The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution pro-
vides that "in all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the
right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State
and district wherein the crime shall have been committed."' The
Supreme Court has interpreted this language to apply only to "seri-
ous," as opposed to "petty," offenses.2
* J.D. Candidate, Fordham University, 1996; B.A., Providence College, 1993.
The author would like to thank Thomas A. Tormey for his thoughtful contributions
throughout the drafting of this Note. The author is also grateful to Professor Daniel
C. Richman for his comments and suggestions and to her family for their encourage-
ment and support.
** Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Thomas Paine (July 11, 1789), in 15 THE PA-
PERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 269 (Julian Boyd ed., 1958).
1. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
2. Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 159 (1968) (citing Cheff v. Schnackenberg,
384 U.S. 373 (1966); District of Columbia v. Clawans, 300 U.S. 617 (1937); Schick v.
United States, 195 U.S. 65 (1904)). This Note will refer to the concept of exempting
certain offenses from the constitutional requirement of jury trial as the "petty offense
exception." Commentators have argued vigorously about the very existence of the
petty offense exception. See, e.g., Felix Frankfurter & Thomas G. Corcoran, Petty Of-
fenses and the Constitutional Guaranty of Trial by Jury, 39 HARV. L. REV. 917 passim
(1926) (supporting the argument that courts should determine the right to jury trial
based on which offenses received trial by jury at common law); George Kaye, Petty
Offenders Have No Peers!, 26 U. CHI. L. REV. 245 passim (1959) (interpreting the
Constitution as including all criminal prosecutions within the jury trial guarantee);
Timothy Lynch, Rethinking the Petty Offense Doctrine, 4 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 7,
11-12 (1994) (arguing that the petty offense doctrine is "an unjustified departure from
both the letter and the underlying philosophy of the Constitution" and proposing that
the serious versus petty distinction "loses much of its appeal" in the context of the
Sixth Amendment because the distinction does not apply to "the right to a speedy
trial," "the right to a public trial," "the right to be informed of the nature and the
cause of the accusation," "the right to confront adverse witnesses," "the right to com-
pulsory process for obtaining favorable witnesses," or "the right to counsel").
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In Baldwin v. New York, 3 the Court articulated a bright-line
methodology for distinguishing "serious" from "petty" offenses. In
order to determine whether an accused has a right to a jury trial,
the Court directed lower courts to assess the maximum statutorily
allowable penalty for a charged offense. Offenses for which the
legislature has authorized a maximum sentence greater than six
months' imprisonment are considered "serious" and therefore give
the accused the right to choose trial by jury.'
The Baldwin standard is relatively straightforward: an offense
carrying a maximum prison sentence of greater than six months is
considered "serious," and any defendant accused of such an of-
fense is constitutionally entitled to a jury trial. The greater-than-
six-month standard, however, does not provide guidance in cases
where an accused is charged with multiple petty offenses that,
when tried in the aggregate, threaten the defendant with a term of
incarceration in excess of six months. Circuit Courts that have ad-
dressed this issue have reached divergent results.5 The Supreme
3. 399 U.S. 66, 69 (1970).
4. A criminal defendant may waive the right to jury trial. FED R. CRIM. P. 23(a).
The defendant must express the waiver voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently.
United States v. Systems Architects, Inc., 757 F.2d 373, 375 (1st Cir. 1985), cert. de-
nied, 474 U.S. 847 (1985). A criminal defendant has no absolute constitutional right
to a nonjury trial. Singer v. United States, 380 U.S. 24, 34-35 (1965) (holding that a
rule requiring that the court and the government consent to a defendant's waiver of
jury trial in a criminal case was valid where the government refused to consent and
the defendant gave no reason for wanting to forego a jury trial other than to save time
and noting that "the ability to waive a constitutional right does not ordinarily carry
with it the right to insist upon the opposite of that right"); United States v. Collamore,
868 F.2d 24, 28 (1st Cir. 1989) (holding that a defendant cannot override the govern-
ment's request for a jury trial absent "compelling" circumstances which "may render
impossible or unlikely an impartial trial by jury" (quoting Singer v. United States, 380
U.S. 24, 37-38 (1965))); United States v. Parker, 742 F.2d 127, 128 n.1 (4th Cir. 1984)
(holding that the defendants had no right to a nonjury trial for perjury when the
judge, who presided at the trial in which the alleged perjury occurred, insisted on a
jury trial for impartiality), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1076 (1984); United States ex rel
Williams v. DeRobertis, 715 F.2d 1174, 1178 (7th Cir. 1983) (dictum) (stating that a
court or a prosecutor can veto a defendant's request for a nonjury trial), cert. denied,
464 U.S. 1072 (1984). See also Walter Pincus, Weinberger Waives Right to Iran-Contra
Jury Trial, WASH. POST, Oct. 9, 1992, at A23 (explaining the dilemma of a defendant
required to face trial by jury when he would rather have a bench trial); Cynthia M.
McKnight, Right to Jury Trial, 82 GEO. L.J. 1033 (1993) (outlining various courts'
approaches, during 1992 and 1993, to the question of whether a defendant has an
absolute right to jury trial).
5. For example, the Second Circuit has refused to extend jury trial protection to a
defendant charged with multiple petty offenses whose aggregate sentence exposure
totaled over six months' incarceration. United States v. Lewis, 65 F.3d 252 (2d Cir.
1995), cert. granted, 116 S.Ct. 807 (Jan. 19, 1996). Courts have not coined consistent
terms for their approaches to the aggregation issue. This Note will adopt the term
JURY ENTITLEMENT
Court, however, will speak on the issue this term when it decides
Lewis v. United States.6
Circuit Courts diverge on two fundamental questions: (i)
whether a defendant charged with multiple petty offenses is enti-
tled to a jury trial when the maximum potential prison sentence for
the charged offenses is greater than six months, and, if so, (ii)
whether such a defendant may be denied that right if the presiding
judge makes a pre-trial commitment that the aggregate sentence
will not exceed six months. This Note addresses and attempts to
resolve each of these questions. Part I outlines the history and de-
velopment of the petty offense exception and the Supreme Court's
jury trial entitlement jurisprudence. In particular, this Part dis-
cusses the fundamental principle of gauging criminal seriousness by
the length of a penalty as authorized by statute. In Part II, this
Note sets out the Circuit split and explains why the courts are di-
vided on the aggregation issue. Part III argues that courts must
aggregate maximum penalties for multiple petty offenses charged
together to accurately reflect legislative determinations of criminal
seriousness. This Part also criticizes the use of pre-trial sentencing
stipulations to circumvent trial by jury when it would otherwise be
required.
I. History and Development of Jury Entitlement Jurisprudence
The right to a jury trial is one of the few rights specifically enu-
merated in the original Articles of the United States Constitution.7
Article III, Section 2 provides that, "[t]he Trial of all Crimes, ex-
cept in Cases of Impeachment, shall be by Jury."'8 This right was
created recently by one commentator-the "individual penalty" approach-to de-
scribe the Second Circuit's method of applying the Baldwin six-month standard to the
penalty for each petty offense charged. Jeff E. Butler, Note, Petty Offenses, Serious
Consequences: Multiple Petty Offenses and the Sixth Amendment Right to Jury Trial, 94
MICH. L. REV. 872, 883 (1995). The Fourth Circuit has granted a jury trial to a petty
offense defendant facing aggregate penalties that potentially exceed six months' im-
prisonment. United States v. Coppins, 953 F.2d 86 (4th Cir. 1991). This Note will
refer to the Coppins standard as "simple aggregation." The Tenth Circuit has also
held that courts must aggregate multiple petty offense penalties to determine whether
a defendant has the right to a jury trial. United States v. Bencheck, 926 F.2d 1517
(10th Cir. 1991). The Bencheck court, however, limited this right by providing that a
trial judge may obviate the need for jury trial by making a pre-trial commitment that
the aggregate sentence imposed will not exceed six months. Hereinafter, this Note
will refer to the Bencheck standard as "limited aggregation."
6. Lewis, 65 F.3d 252.
7. Lynch, supra note 2, at 8.
8. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2. The rest of the jury trial provision reads: "and such
Trial shall be held in the State where the said Crimes shall have been committed; but
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further secured by the Sixth Amendment to the Constitution,
which guarantees "[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall
enjoy the right to a... trial, by an impartial jury of the State and
district wherein the crime shall have been committed .... 9
Although the language of the Sixth Amendment expressly states
that "all criminal prosecutions"' 10 should be undertaken before a
jury, the Supreme Court has concluded that the Framers "tacitly
excluded petty offenses from the ambit of the jury clauses in Arti-
cle III and the Sixth Amendment. . .. " Indeed, in the Framers'
era, offenses which were considered "petty" were commonly adju-
dicated before a justice of the peace without a jury and with no
right to an appeal. 12
when not committed within any State, the Trial shall be at such Place or Places as the
Congress by law may have directed."
9. The rest of the amendment reads: "which district shall have been previously
ascertained by law, and to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to
be confronted with the witnesses against him; to have compulsory process for ob-
taining witnesses in his favor, and to have the Assistance of Counsel at his request."
U.S. CONST. amend. VI. The right to jury trial applies to state criminal proceedings
through the Due Process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Duncan v. Louisiana,
391 U.S. 145, 149 (1968).
10. U.S. CONST. amend. VI (emphasis added).
11. See Blanton v. City of North Las Vegas, 489 U.S. 538, 541 (1989); Duncan, 391
U.S. at 158. See also Stephen C. Larson, Comment, United States v. Bencheck: Aggre-
gate Penalties and Jury Entitlement in Multiple Petty Offense Cases, 69 DENv. U. L.
REV. 763, 764 (1992).
12. See Frankfurter & Corcoran, supra note 2 at 963-64. Example of offenses
which were adjudicated by a justice of the peace or a magistrate for which "the penal-
ties were not severe" include
Laws concerning liquor selling, highways, waterways and ferries, currency,
Indians, peddling ... tobacco, flour and beef trades[,] ... seamen, hunting
and fishing .... On the whole, the penalties were not severe, although fifty
shillings could be imposed for illegal hunting, five pounds each was extracted
from mutinous seamen, sellers of corn at extortionate prices, unlicensed ped-
dlers, shipmasters carrying tobacco in bulk, those taking tobacco from a
warehouse, or packing it in undersized barrels, and twenty pounds was the
penalty for harboring a deserter.
Id. However, at the time of the ratification of the Constitution, jury trials in crimi-
nal cases had already existed in England for several centuries and "carried impressive
credentials traced by many to the Magna Carta." Duncan, 391 U.S. at 151 (citing W.
Blackstone, 4 COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 349 (Cooley ed. 1899)).
There is much evidence to show that the right to jury trial was considered a funda-
mental right carried over from England by the settlers who brought the right with
them "as a part of that admirable common law which had fenced around and inter-
posed barriers on every side against the approaches of arbitrary power." J. Story, 2
COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES § 1779.
JURY ENTITLEMENT
A. Early Benchmarks of Seriousness: The Origins and
Evolution of the Criteria for Distinguishing Petty and
Serious Offenses
Before 1970,13 courts distinguished serious offenses from petty
ones by looking to common law indictability and the moral quality
of offenses.
1. Indictability at Common Law
In Callan v. Wilson, 4 the Court reversed an 1888 conspiracy con-
viction and granted a jury trial based on the common law principle
that a person accused of conspiracy "was entitled to be tried by
jury." The Court acknowledged that the jury trial guarantee does
not encompass "petty offenses,' 1 5 but rejected the government's
contention that conspiracy was a petty offense.16 Based on a find-
ing that conspiracy was indictable at common law,17 the Court de-
clared it to be a serious offense. The Court went on to state that
offenses "which, according to the common law, may be proceeded
against summarily in any tribunal legally constituted for that pur-
pose" are considered "petty.' 8 Thus, after Callan, courts used
common law indictability as a fundamental test for distinguishing
serious offenses from petty ones.
2. The Moral Nature of the Offense.
In the 1904 case of Schick v. United States,19 the Supreme Court
established that the moral quality of an offense can also be an indi-
cation of its seriousness. 20 The defendant in Schick, a retail butter
dealer, was convicted of buying oleomargarine that had not been
13. Baldwin v. New York, 399 U.S. 66 (1970). In Baldwin, the Supreme Court
established a benchmark standard for distinguishing "serious" offenses from "petty"
offenses. Specifically, the Court held that "no offense can be deemed 'petty' for pur-
poses of the right to trial by jury where imprisonment for more than six months is
authorized." Id. at 69. See infra Part II.B.
14. 127 U.S. 540, 549 (1888).
15. Id. at 557. In an often-cited law review article, the future Justice Frankfurter
argued that the jury trial provisions must be interpreted in terms of common law jury
trial entitlement. See Frankfurter & Corcoran, supra note 2, at 971.
16. Id.
17. Id. The court concluded that, at common law, conspiracy was an "infamous
crime" and hence indictable at grand jury.
18. Id. at 557.
19. 195 U.S. 65 (1904).
20. Id. at 67-68. The Schick court also considered the severity of the punishment
under the statute which was a fifty dollar fine. Id. This analysis foreshadowed the
Court's use of maximum penalties as the primary criteria for determining jury entitle-
ment. See infra Part II.B.
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stamped in accordance with a tax statute.2 ' Based on its finding
that the crime was "not necessarily one involving any moral delin-
quency,"22 the Court concluded that it was petty, and therefore did
not require trial by jury.
By contrast, in District of Columbia v. Colts,23 the Court found
the crime of "reckless driving so as to endanger property and indi-
viduals" to be a malum in se offense-wrong in itself because of its
inherently evil nature. 24 Such a crime was "an act of such obvious
depravity that to characterize it as a petty offense would be to
shock the general moral sense. '2 5  Accordingly, the Court con-
cluded that the defendant in Colts deserved a jury trial.
B. The Modem Test for Seriousness: Maximum Sentence
Exposure
The traditional approach of gauging seriousness in terms of com-
mon law indictability and moral nature, however, "proved net-
tlesome and yielded incongruous results. '26 Consequently, the
Court "sought more objective indications of the seriousness with
which society regards [an] offense. '27
In 1968, in Duncan v. Louisiana,28 the Supreme Court consid-
ered whether a defendant convicted of simple battery, a misde-
meanor punishable by a maximum of two years' imprisonment and
21. Id. at 67-68.
22. Id. at 67.
23. 282 U.S. 63 (1930). The Court further developed the moral nature test in Dis-
trict of Columbia v. Clawans, 300 U.S. 617 (1937). In Clawans, the Court found that
selling second-hand goods without a license was not a serious crime, but merely a
petty offense because it was only "an infringement of local police regulations and its
moral quality is relatively inoffensive." Id. at 625.
24. Colts, 282 U.S. at 73. See BLACK'S LAW DIcriONARY 959 (6th ed. 1990). "An
act is said to be malum in se when it is inherently and essentially evil, that is, immoral
in its nature and injurious in its consequences, without any regard to the fact of its
being noticed or punished by the law of the state." The Court also determined that
the offense was indictable at common law. Colts, 282 U.S. at 73.
25. Id.
26. Brief for Appellee at 7, United States v. Lewis, 65 F.3d 252 (2d Cir. 1995), cert.
granted, 116 S.Ct. 807 (Jan. 19, 1996)(citing Blanton v. City of North Las Vegas, 489
U.S. 538, 541 (1989)) (brief prepared by Assistant United States Attorneys Susan
Corkery and James Walden of the United States Attorney's Office for the Eastern
District of New York).
27. Blanton, 489 U.S. at 541 (quoting Frank v. United States, 395 U.S. 147, 148
(1969)). The Blanton Court noted that "[the Court's] adherence to a common-law
approach has been undermined by the substantial number of statutory offenses lack-
ing common law antecedents." Id. at n.5 (citing Landry v. Hoepfner, 840 F.2d 1201,
1209-1210 (5th Cir. 1988)(en banc), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1083 (1989)).
28. 391 U.S. 145 (1968).
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a $300 fine, was improperly denied a jury trial. Upon conviction,
the defendant was sentenced to serve sixty days in prison and pay a
$150 fine.29
The Duncan Court looked to the maximum authorized legisla-
tive penalty for simple battery in order to determine its level of
seriousness.3 0 Recognizing that the "boundaries of the petty of-
fense category have always been ill-defined," the Court sought to
establish more "objective criteria" to aid in jury trial determina-
tions.3' Thus, the Court looked to "the penalty authorized by the
law of the locality... 'as a gauge of its social and ethical judgments
... 32 While the Court declined to designate a specific term of
imprisonment to distinguish petty offenses from serious ones, it did
determine that, in the specific circumstances before the court, "a
crime punishable by two years in prison is, based on past and con-
temporary standards in this country, a serious crime and not a
petty offense. "' 3 The Duncan opinion clearly establishes that po-
tential sentence exposure, not the sentence actually imposed, is the
proper measure of an offense's seriousness.
In 1970, in Baldwin v. New York,3 the Supreme Court estab-
lished that an offense carrying a potential sentence of more than six
months is "serious" and thus triggers the right to a jury trial. The
Supreme Court held that a potential one-year sentence for "jos-
tling," a misdemeanor offense, (neither indictable at common law
nor a crime of moral depravity,) was enough in itself to trigger the
29. Id. at 146. Justice White, writing for the majority, noted that "[a] right to jury
trial is granted to criminal defendants in order to prevent oppression by the govern-
ment." Id. at 155. The Court further interpreted this feature of the jury trial right to
provide "an accused with the right to be tried by a jury of his peers... an inestimable
safeguard against the corrupt or overzealous prosecutor and against the compliant,
biased or eccentric judge." Id. at 156. Based on a determination that the right is
fundamental to our system of justice, the Court's holding made the Sixth Amendment
jury trial guarantee binding on the States through the Due Process Clause. Id.
30. Id. at 159. Although the trial court had sentenced the defendant to sixty days'
imprisonment, the court focused on the authorized legislative penalty which was two
years. The Supreme Court affirmed the appellate court's rejection of the actual sen-
tence as an indicator of the crime's severity. Id.
31. Id. at 161 (citing District of Columbia v. Clawans, 300 U.S. 617 (1937)).
32. Id. at 160 (quoting Clawans, 300 U.S. at 628).
33. Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 162 (1968).
34. 399 U.S. 66 (1970).
35. Id. at 69 n.6 ("A potential sentence in excess of six months' imprisonment is
sufficiently severe by itself to take the offense out of the category of 'petty.' "). In
Baldwin, the New York City Criminal Court, in a non-jury trial, convicted the defend-
ant of a misdemeanor punishable by a maximum term of twelve months' imprison-
ment. The New York Court of Appeals rejected Baldwin's argument that he was
unconstitutionally denied a jury trial and affirmed the conviction. Id.
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defendant's right to a jury trial.36 The Court's landmark holding
was that "no offense can be deemed 'petty' for purposes of the
right to trial by jury where imprisonment for more than six months
is authorized. '37
The Baldwin Court rejected the prosecutor's suggestion that the
distinction between misdemeanors and felonies should dictate what
are petty or serious offenses.38 Instead, the Court noted the "near
uniform judgment" of the states that a potential prison sentence of
six months marked the appropriate distinction between petty and
serious offenses.39 Accordingly, the court held that "some misde-
meanors .. . are also 'serious' offenses. 4°
The Court acknowledged the tension between two competing
goals: the need to efficiently allocate limited judicial resources and
the need to fulfill the Sixth Amendment's fundamental purpose of
protecting defendants from government oppression.41 The Court
recognized that the prospect of imprisonment for any amount of
time "will seldom be viewed by the accused as a trivial or 'petty'
matter, and may well result in quite serious repercussions affecting
[the defendant's] career and his reputation." 42 Nevertheless, in
some circumstances, "these disadvantages, onerous though they
may be, may be outweighed by the benefits that result from speedy
and inexpensive non-jury adjudications. '43 The Baldwin Court
thus held that the potential length of the statutory penalty for an
36. Id. at 74.
37. Id. Justice Black, joined by Justice Douglas in his concurrence, agreed that the
defendant deserved a jury trial, but rejected the entire concept of the petty offense
exception. Black favored a strict interpretation of the constitutional provisions which
would grant jury trial "in all criminal prosecutions" and for "all crimes." For Black,
any attempt to balance the interests of defendants with administrative efficiency was
"judicial mutilation of our written Constitution." Id. at 75. He reasoned that the
Framers completed all of the balancing necessary in deciding that "the value of a jury
trial far outweighed its costs for 'all crimes' and '[iun all criminal prosecutions.' " Id.
38. Id. at 70.
39. The Court noted that on a federal level, 18 U.S.C. § 1 defined petty offenses as
those punishable by no more than six months in prison and a $500 fine. Looking to
recent history on the state level, the Court found that the category of offenses in the
states triable without a jury had been reduced to one: the New York City statute at
issue in the case. Baldwin v. New York, 399 U.S. 66, 70 (1970). The Court relied upon
"the existing laws and practices of the nation" and followed the over-six-month stan-
dard employed in state and federal practice. Id.
40. Id.
41. Id. at 73.
42. Id.
43. Id. Compelled to draw a line, the Baldwin Court concluded that "administra-
tive conveniences" cannot "justify denying an accused the important right to trial by
jury where the possible penalty exceeds six months' imprisonment." Id.
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offense, and not the penalty actually imposed, is the proper indica-
tor of criminal seriousness." In other words, if a defendant is ac-
cused of a crime for which the penalty may exceed six months'
imprisonment, that defendant is entitled to a jury trial, even if the
prosecution does not intend to seek the full potential penalty and
the judge has no intention of imposing it.
C. Post-Baldwin "Seriousness"
Baldwin left open the question whether an offense carrying a
maximum sentence of less than six months could be deemed seri-
ous for the purpose of requiring trial by jury.45 In the twenty years
following Baldwin, courts generally accepted that the length of an
offense's potential punishment is the best measure of its serious-
ness.46 In some circumstances, however, courts were reluctant to
apply maximum sentence exposure as the exclusive considera-
tion.47 In 1989, the Supreme Court refined the Baldwin standard in
44. Baldwin v. New York, 399 U.S. 66, 73 (1970). However, where the legislature
has not determined a maximum sentence for a particular offense, courts evaluate the
penalty actually imposed as a measure of seriousness. See Duncan v. Louisiana, 391
U.S. 145, 161-62 & n.35 (1968); Blanton v. City of North Las Vegas, 489 U.S. 538, 542
n.6 (1989); Codispoti v. Pennsylvania, 418 U.S. 506, 511 (1974); Frank v. United
States, 395 U.S. 147, 149 (1969); Bloom v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 194, 211 (1968).
45. Baldwin, 399 U.S. at 68-69 & n.6.
46. See, e.g., United States v. Craner, 652 F.2d 23 (9th Cir. 1981). "An offense is
not 'serious' because it is severely punished; it is severely punished because it is 'seri-
ous.' The severity of prescribed sanctions is regarded as the best objective indication
of the general normative judgment of the seriousness of an offense." Id. at 24.
47. After Baldwin, some courts, perhaps in response to equity considerations,
tended to grant jury trials even where the maximum authorized penalty was not
greater than six months. See, e.g., Craner, 652 F.2d 23, 26 (1981) (ruling that the po-
tential revocation of the defendant's driver's license was a "collateral effect" of con-
viction raising the offense to the level of serious and thus warranting trial by jury).
This tendency was particularly apparent where substantial monetary fines were im-
posed as part of a particular sentence. See also United States v. Hamdan, 552 F.2d
276 (9th Cir. 1977) (finding a fine in excess of $500 to be a "serious" punishment for
an offense with a maximum prison term of six months and distinguishing between
individual and non-individual defendants, noting that "it is not unrealistic to treat any
fine in excess of $500 as a serious matter to all individuals"); Rife v. Godbehere, 814
F.2d 563, 565 (1987) (granting a jury trial because the $1,000 fine imposed upon the
defendant exceeded what the court found to be to be the minimum potential amount
necessary to trigger an individual's right to jury trial under Hamdan: $500); Muniz v.
Hoffman, 422 U.S. 454 (1975) (acknowledging that fines alone could be sufficiently
severe to trigger the right to jury trial, yet holding that a $10,000 fine imposed on a
labor union, charged on a per capita basis to the 13,000 union members, did not have
a "serious" effect on any one individual and thus did not warrant a jury trial); United
States -v. McAlister, 630 F.2d 772, 774-75 (10th Cir. 1980) (granting a defendant
charged with trespass on a nuclear plant site the right to jury trial because the possible
imposition of a $1,000 fine exceeded the statutory definition of a petty offense).
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Blanton v. City of North Las Vegas, 8 where the Court held that
offenses carrying a maximum penalty of six months' imprisonment
or less are presumptively petty.4 9 In Blanton, the consolidated de-
fendants had been convicted, without a jury trial, of driving under
the influence of alcohol ("DUI"). 5 0 Each defendant faced a maxi-
mum penalty of six months' incarceration or, alternatively, forty-
eight hours' community service while identifiably dressed as a DUI
offender.51 In addition, the defendants faced up to $1,000 in fines,
mandatory attendance at an alcohol abuse education course, and
loss of a driver's license for ninety days.52
The Blanton Court reiterated the accepted principle that legisla-
tive penalties are the best indicators of criminal seriousness, stating
that the "primary emphasis ... must be placed on the maximum
authorized period of incarceration. ' 53 Nonetheless, the Court
noted that in "rare situation[s]," a defendant accused of a presump-
tively petty offense has a right to jury trial if he can show that "any
additional statutory penalties, viewed in conjunction with the maxi-
mum authorized period of incarceration, are so severe that they
clearly reflect a legislative determination that the offense in ques-
tion is a 'serious' one."' 54 The defendants in Blanton were unable
to meet this standard and consequently did not receive a jury
trial.55 Accordingly, after Blanton, offenses carrying a maximum
prison term of less than six months are presumptively "petty, '56
but courts can consider additional penalties that significantly in-
fringe upon personal freedom.57
48. 489 U.S. 538 (1989).
49. Id. at 543.
50. Id. at 538.
51. Id at 539-40.
52. Id. For a detailed discussion of the double jeopardy implications of prosecut-
ing a driver for DUI after a 90-day license suspension, see Carlos F. Ramirez, Note,
Administrative License Suspension, Criminal Prosecutions and the Double Jeopardy
Clause, 23 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 923 (1996).
53. Blanton v. City of North Las Vegas, 489 U.S. 538, 542 (1989).
54. Id. at 543.
55. Id.
56. Id
57. This standard is imprecise at best and its application has proven uneven. For
example, in United States v. Nachtigal, 507 U.S. 1, 5 (1993), the Court denied a jury
trial to DWI defendants faced with penalties harsher than those in Blanton. The
Court determined that the combined maximum penalties of six months' incarceration
or five years' probation, and a $5,000 fine was not sufficiently serious. Id. at 4-5. Fur-
thermore, according to the applicable regulations, the Nachtigal defendant faced the
possible attachment of twenty-one conditions to probation, including restitution, in-
house alcohol program attendance, night and weekend custody in the care of the Bu-
reau of Prisons, in-house arrest when not working, and residence in, or services for, a
904
JURY ENTITLEMENT
Today, courts separate petty offenses from serious offenses ac-
cording to the Baldwin-Blanton standard: an offense carrying a
maximum penalty exceeding six months' imprisonment is "seri-
ous," and triggers the right to jury trial; an offense having a maxi-
mum authorized sentence of less than six months is presumptively
"petty," but a defendant can overcome this presumption by show-
ing that additional ancillary penalties are sufficiently severe to
transform the charge into a "serious" offense.
H. The Circuit Split: Are Aggregated Petty Offenses "Serious"?
A defendant charged with an offense punishable by more than
six months in prison is clearly entitled to a jury trial. When a de-
fendant is charged with multiple petty offenses, however, none of
which would individually trigger jury trial entitlement, Baldwin and
its progeny do not provide direction to lower courts. A defendant
charged with multiple petty offenses can face prison time of several
years, which would seem to weigh heavily toward a determination
of "seriousness." Prosecutors, however, in these cases always have
the option of pursuing each petty charge separately, thus nullifying
a defendant's claim to jury trial entitlement.
This term, in deciding Lewis v. United States,5 the Supreme
Court will consider whether defendants, charged with multiple
petty offenses arising from one incident, and facing a potential
prison sentence exceeding six months are entitled to a jury trial. 9
In addition, the Court will decide whether a judge's pre-trial com-
mitment not to sentence the defendant to a prison term of more
than six months could obviate such a right.6 °
This Part will describe the diverging views of the lower courts.
Some courts have applied the "individual penalty approach" and
considered the maximum statutory penalty for each separate mis-
demeanor offense in relation to the greater-than-six-months stan-
dard. Consequently, these courts have refused to extend jury trial
protection to any defendant charged with multiple petty offenses
regardless of whether his aggregate sentence totaled more than six
community correctional facility. Id. at 5. In contrast, some courts have provided jury
trials for drunk driving offenders because they have found that the potential punish-
ments were "serious." See, e.g., Richter v. Fairbanks, 903 F.2d 1202, 1208 (8th Cir.
1990) (granting a jury trial even though the maximum prison term was only six
months because the additional fifteen-year drivers' license revocation indicated a leg-
islative determination that the offense was serious).
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months.6' Other courts have employed "limited aggregation."
These courts have aggregated penalties for related offenses but
limited the jury trial right by holding that a judge may obviate the
need for jury trial by making a pre-trial commitment not to impose
a sentence exceeding six months or by reducing a sentence on ap-
peal.62 Finally, some courts have employed "simple aggregation"
and made jury trials available to defendants facing multiple petty
offense charges carrying aggregate penalty exposure exceeding six
months.63
A. The Individual Penalty Approach
The Second and Eleventh Circuits have denied jury trials to de-
fendants charged with multiple petty offense counts who faced ag-
gregate penalties of over six months in prison. In 1995, the Second
Circuit, in United States v. Lewis,' ruled that an individual charged
and convicted of two petty offenses, each carrying a maximum sen-
tence of six months' imprisonment,65 was not entitled to a jury
trial.66
A magistrate judge sentenced the defendant in Lewis to three
years' probation for each of the two counts, to run concurrently.67
The defendant argued that the Baldwin-Blanton standard afforded
him the right to a jury trial because his potential punishment ex-
ceeded six months' imprisonment.68 The Second Circuit recog-
nized that "no offense can be deemed 'petty' for purposes of the
right to trial by jury where imprisonment for more than six months
is authorized" 69 and agreed that "any defendant facing in excess of
six months' incarceration for a single offense is entitled to a jury
trial. '70
61. Id.; United States v. Brown, 71 F.3d 845 (11th Cir. 1996).
62. United States v. Bencheck, 926 F.2d 1512, 1518 (10th Cir. 1991); Rife v. God-
behere, 814 F.2d 563 (9th Cir. 1987).
63. See United States v. Coppins, 953 F.2d 86 (4th Cir. 1991); United States v.
Potvin, 481 F.2d 380 (10th Cir. 1973); United States v. Musgrave, 695 F. Supp. 231,
232-33 (W.D. Va. 1988); United States v. Coleman, 664 F. Supp. 548, 549 (D.D.C.
1985).
64. 65 F.3d 252 (2d Cir. 1995), cert. granted, 116 S.Ct. 807 (Jan. 19, 1996).




69. United States v. Lewis, 65 F.3d 252, 254 (2d Cir. 1995), cert. granted, 116 S.Ct.
807 (Jan. 19, 1996) (quoting Baldwin v. New York, 399 U.S. 66, 69 (1970)).
70. Id.
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While acknowledging that maximum legislative penalties are the
best indicia of the seriousness of an offense, however, the court
held that when a defendant is charged with multiple petty offenses,
the interests of judicial economy prevail over that defendant's right
to jury trial.7' The Lewis court observed that if the government
severed the two charges and prosecuted them separately, "the
question of [the defendant's] right to a jury trial could have been
obviated altogether. ' 72 According to the court, judicial efficiency,
when "imposed at no greater risk to the defendant[,] should not
change the standard for determining whether the defendant is
given a jury trial." 73
The Second Circuit bolstered its decision by reference to legisla-
tive intent. "While [the other circuits] that have previously ad-
dressed the question have focused upon the defendant's view as to
the seriousness of facing over six months' imprisonment for aggre-
gate sentences, the appropriate inquiry is how seriously Congress
views the offenses .... ",T' Federal law dictates that multiple terms
of imprisonment imposed simultaneously for petty offenses run
concurrently75 unless the judge or applicable law provides other-
wise. The Second Circuit interpreted this law to reflect a Congres-
sional recognition that "multiple offenses prosecuted jointly are no
more serious in their aggregate than the most serious single offense
of conviction. ' 76 The court thus held that while multiple petty
counts tried together may expose a defendant to an aggregate sen-
tence of more than six months in prison, Congress did not intend
that these counts, by their multiplicity, become "serious" offenses
that mandate jury trial.77
The Eleventh Circuit, in United States v. Brown,78 considered
facts similar to those in Lewis, and reached the same conclusion.
The Brown defendant was charged with two petty offenses arising
from one incident, each count carrying a maximum penalty of six
71. Id at 255.
72. Id.
73. Id (citing United States v. Coppins, 953 F.2d 86, 92 (Niemeyer, J., dissenting)).
The Baldwin Court further stated, "[t]he mere fact that the government chose to con-
solidate the charges [to purportedly conserve judicial resources] provides no greater
justification for a jury trial than if the charges were tried separately." Id.
74. United States v. Lewis, 65 F.3d 252, 254 (2d. Cir. 1995), cert. granted, 116 S.Ct.
807 (Jan. 19, 1996).
75. 18 U.S.C. § 3584(a)(1985). Terms run concurrently unless the judge exerts his
power to impose consecutive terms or the statute mandates otherwise. § 3584(a).
76. Lewis, 65 F.3d at 255.
77. Id.
78. 71 F.3d 845 (11th Cir. 1996).
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months' imprisonment.79 A magistrate judge, sitting without a
jury, found the defendant guilty of one count and imposed a sen-
tence of three months' unsupervised probation.80 The defendant
appealed, arguing that he had been entitled to a jury trial because
he had faced a potential sentence of twelve months'
imprisonment.8'
Following the Second Circuit's reasoning in Lewis,' the Elev-
enth Circuit affirmed Brown's conviction. 83 The court acknowl-
edged that legislatively authorized maximum penalties are the
ultimate indicator of criminal seriousness, but held that a court
should evaluate each charge independently. 84 In the interest of ju-
dicial efficiency, the court held that consolidation of charges should
not render a group of petty offenses "serious. '85 The defendant in
Brown, charged with two six-month counts, had been charged with
"no serious offense. '86 "This is the case," the Eleventh Circuit con-
cluded, "where multiple zeros still add up to zero. "87
B. The Limited Aggregation Approach
The Tenth Circuit, in United States v. Bencheck, held that a trial
judge may obviate a defendant's right to a jury trial by making a
pre-trial commitment not to sentence the defendant to an aggre-
79. Id. at 846. Each charge also carried a potential $5,000 fine which could be
imposed in addition to incarceration. Id.
80. Id. The Magistrate also imposed a fine of $140, and a special assessment of ten
dollars. Id.
81. Id.
82. The Eleventh Circuit, following the Second Circuit in Lewis, relied on the rea-
soning of Judge Niemeyer in his dissent in Coppins, and held that "multiple petty
offenses should not be aggregated ...." Id. at 847 (quoting United States v. Coppins,
953 F.2d 86, 92 (4th Cir. 1991) (Niemeyer, J., dissenting)).
83. United States v. Brown, 71 F.3d 845, 847 (11th Cir. 1996). The court noted
that "concerns for judicial economy [that] may motivate the joinder of multiple




87. Id. (quoting United States v. Coppins, 953 F.2d 86, 92 (4th Cir. 1991)). In his
dissent in Coppins, Circuit Judge Niemeyer argued that multiple petty offenses should
not be aggregated, and thus would have found no right to jury trial. Id. He found that
"[s]imply because the offenses were tried together or on one charging document is ...
irrelevant to the constitutional inquiry." For Niemeyer, because only misdemeanor
offenses were charged, the defendant was not entitled to the protection of a jury trial.
Niemeyer reasoned that the government's decision to consolidate the charges pro-
vided no greater justification for granting a jury trial than if the charges had been
addressed separately. "Judicial efficiency imposed at no greater risk to the defendant
should not change the standard for determining whether the defendant is given a jury
trial." Id.
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gate sentence exceeding six months.8 8 The court reasoned that the
penalty the defendant actually faces, not the maximum potential
penalty under the statute, is "of primary importance to the defend-
ant."'8 9 Because the defendant in Bencheck "was not at risk of serv-
ing more than six months when he was tried on the four petty
charges stemming from a single occurrence," the court denied him
the right to a jury trial.90
The Bencheck court recognized the danger that prosecutors
could bring multiple petty offense charges separately, specifically
to threaten the defendant with the consequences of a serious of-
fense while denying him the opportunity for jury trial.91 The gov-
ernment could sever charges even when a given set of offenses
arise from a discrete criminal act, transaction, or occurrence simply
to prosecute the defendant without a jury. While the court ac-
knowledged that the potential for prosecutorial abuse of this na-
ture is limited, it observed that such a "risk is not zero."'  To
prevent such abuse, the court held that a defendant who "demon-
strates ... that there is a reasonable probability the state is under-
taking the prosecution of the petty charge, or charges, out of spite
or vindictiveness" is entitled to a jury trial.93
Judge Ebel, dissenting in Bencheck, would have applied simple
aggregation to determine whether a jury trial was appropriate.94
Basing a defendant's Sixth Amendment rights on the pre-trial pro-
nouncements of a trial judge, according to Ebel, invites the judici-
ary to violate the Supreme Court's clear mandate to look to
"objective indications of the seriousness with which society regards
the offense. ' 95 As a consequence, reliance upon a judicially im-
posed sentence for the purpose of determining criminal seriousness
is improper because it only considers the subjective sentiments of
that particular judge rather than the level of seriousness with which
society views the offense.96
88. United States v. Bencheck, 926 F.2d 1512, 1513 (10th Cir. 1991).
89. Id. at 1518 (quoting Haar v. Hanrahan, 708 F.2d 1547, 1550 (10th Cir. 1983)).
90. Id. at 1520.
91. Id. at 1519.
92. United States v. Bencheck, 926 F.2d 1512, 1519 (10th Cir. 1991).
93. Id.
94. For Ebel, Blanton mandated "in no uncertain terms" that a court must apply
an objective standard when considering defendants' Sixth Amendment claims. Id. at
1521 (Ebel, J., dissenting).
95. Id. (quoting Blanton v. City of North Las Vegas, 489 U.S. 538, 541 (1989)).
96. Id. (quoting Blanton, 489 U.S. at 541). Particularly problematic for Judge Ebel
was the majority's reliance on Haar v. Hanrahan, 708 F.2d 1547 (10th Cir. 1983). In
Haar, the Tenth Circuit favored subjective penalties over objective ones in determin-
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The Ninth Circuit also applied the aggregation principle exclu-
sively to the penalties actually imposed for multiple petty charges
arising from one incident.97 An improper denial of a jury trial in
the Ninth Circuit, however, may be "remedied" by a judge's subse-
quent reduction of the actual sentence imposed.98 In Rife v. God-
behere, after denying a jury trial, a state court convicted the
defendant of three separate counts of a misdemeanor, each punish-
able by six months' imprisonment and sentenced him to two con-
secutive six-month terms.99 After the case was appealed and
remanded twice, the state court reduced Rife's sentence to six
months' imprisonment. 100 The Ninth Circuit did not apply the ag-
gregation principle, but rather made an analogy between the impo-
sition of consecutive sentences to the imposition of a sentence
when the legislature has not authorized a maximum sentence. 101
Consequently, the court looked to the judge's actual exercise of
discretion-the imposition of consecutive sentences exceeding six
months.10 2 Thus, the court found that under Baldwin, the defend-
ant in Rife was entitled to jury trial "because he was sentenced to a
total of more than six months."'0 3
Because the actual penalty facing the defendant at the time of
the appeal was exactly six months in prison, however, the Rife
court did not reverse.10 4 The defendant's sentence had been re-
duced by the judge, which led the Ninth Circuit to conclude that
ing criminal seriousness. The Bencheck majority cited Haar in deeming jury trial ap-
propriate only when a defendant actually faces potential incarceration of six months.
Judge Ebel pointed out that the Supreme Court in Blanton overruled Haar, by man-
dating that courts look to "objective indications." The Haar approach, after Blanton,
is no longer good law. Therefore, for Ebel, only the legislative maximum penalty,
rather then any prior determination by the trial judge, is the proper standard for gaug-
ing criminal seriousness. Bencheck, 926 F.2d at 1521-22. It is noteworthy that the
Second Circuit in Lewis declined to resolve the question of whether the magistrate
judge's pre-trial assurance obviated the need for jury trial. In dicta, however, the
Lewis court concluded that such a promise before trial could not serve as the basis for
denying jury trial. "Self-imposed limitations on sentencing by the court cannot de-
prive a defendant of his constitutionally protected right to jury trial." United States v.
Lewis, 65 F.3d 252, 256 (2d Cir. 1995).
97. Rife v. Godbehere, 814 F.2d 563, 565 (9th Cir. 1987).
98. Id.
99. Id. at 563.
100. Id.
101. Id.





the constitutional violation was "remedied" and the right to jury
trial did not attach.10 5
C. The Simple Aggregation Approach
The Fourth, Ninth and Tenth Circuits have held that defendants
charged with multiple petty offenses carrying aggregate sentences
of more than six months are entitled to trial by jury. For example,
in United States v. Coppins,1°6 the defendant faced three petty of-
fense charges that exposed her to an aggregate potential sentence
of fifteen months in prison.10 7 At a bench trial, she was convicted
of two counts and fined $170.108 On appeal, the defendant argued
that she deserved the right to a jury trial based on the severity of
the aggregate maximum authorized penalty. 0 9
The Fourth Circuit vacated and remanded the lower court's deci-
sion, holding that when petty offenses stemming from a single inci-
dent are joined for trial, criminal seriousness is properly
determined by aggregating the maximum sentences legislatively
authorized. 110 Thus, because the aggregate potential punishment
she faced exceeded six months' imprisonment, the Coppins defend-
ant deserved the option of trial by jury.
Invoking the fundamental principle that the Sixth Amendment is
intended to protect individuals from government oppression, the
Coppins court focused on the defendant's perception of the pro-
ceedings, and reasoned that "defendants can view as no less serious
a possible penalty of [over six months] in prison, when charged
with [multiple] offenses ... than if charged with one offense hav-
ing a potential penalty of [greater than six months] . . . . Nor
should a court view the offenses any less seriously.""' The court
105. Id. The court reasoned that "although a sentence in excess of six months'
incarceration denied Rife his constitutional right to a jury trial, this violation has been
[retroactively] 'remedied' by the state court's ultimate imposition of a sentence not
exceeding six months." Id.
106. 953 F.2d 86 (4th Cir. 1991). The predecessor to Coppins was United States v.
Potvin, in which the Tenth Circuit developed the "same act, transaction or occur-
rence" test. 481 F.2d 380, 383-84 (10th Cir. 1973). In Potvin, the Tenth Circuit held
that a person charged with two or more petty offenses arising out of the same act,
transaction or occurrence is entitled to a trial by jury when the potential aggregate
penalty on all counts exceeds six months' imprisonment. Id.
107. Coppins, 953 F.2d at 86. The defendant also faced a potential $1,300 in fines.
Id. at 87-88.
'108. Id at 87.
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. Coppins, 953 F.2d at 90 (quoting United States v. Potvin, 481 F.2d 380, 382
(10th Cir. 1973)).
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noted that "a criminal prosecution can threaten the defendant with
the consequences of a serious offense, even though the defendant
is not charged with an offense deemed serious... "112 and recog-
nized the need to protect the defendant from such a risk.
The court also stated that the prime indicator of seriousness is
the "legislative judgment expressed in any maximum sentence of
imprisonment authorized by statute,' 1 3 rather than any subjective
standard. Accordingly, the Fourth Circuit rejected the govern-
ment's argument that the sentence "actually imposed" in any case
determined the right to a jury trial." 4
Although the Coppins court declined to decide whether a judge's
pre-trial commitment not to impose a prison sentence in excess of
six months obviated the need for jury trial, it did shed some light
on the issue. 1 5 The court rejected the government's contention
that the jury trial challenge had been mooted by the court's actual
sentence of less than six months and concluded that "[a]n arguably
unconstitutionally obtained conviction cannot be immunized from
challenge by finding the challenge mooted by the sentence im-
posed. 1" 6 Presumably because the fundamental purpose of the
Sixth Amendment is to protect the defendant from government op-
pression, the court looked to the defendant's perspective. From
the defendant's point of view, "[w]hat is being asserted on appeal is
the right not to be convicted in the first place except by a jury." 7
112. Coppins, 953 F.2d at 90 (quoting United States v. Musgrave, 695 F.Supp. 231,
232 (W.D. Va. 1988)).
113. Coppins, 953 F.2d at 89.
114. Id.
115. "Some courts ... have held that a court may, by pre-trial formal commitment
not to impose a sentence of imprisonment in excess of six months, remove any right to
jury trial that otherwise would obtain .... We express no opinion on this alternative,
noting that the Bencheck panel was divided on the issue whether such an alternative
survived Blanton's emphasis on the primacy of objective indicators." Id. at 89 n.2
(citations omitted).
116. Id. at 88.
117. United States v. Coppins, 953 F.2d 86, 88 (4th Cir. 1991). Similarly, in United
States v. Bencheck, the defendant was charged with four petty offenses that individu-
ally did not carry a possibility of more than six months' incarceration, but carried "an
aggregate potential penalty of greater than six months' imprisonment." 926 F.2d 1512
(10th Cir. 1991). The potential statutory sentence totaled two years in prison. Id. at
1513. The court held that a defendant is entitled to a jury trial for multiple petty
offenses arising out of the same act, transaction, or occurrence ... if he is actually
threatened at the commencement of trial with an aggregate potential penalty of
greater than six months' imprisonment." Id.
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HI. Defendants Charged With Petty Offenses, Facing an
Aggregate Sentence of Over Six Months, are Charged
with Serious Offenses That Merit Trial by Jury
The right to jury trial is an individual's safeguard against arbi-
trary and oppressive government power. 118 The right has been de-
scribed as "inestimable,""' 9 "sacred,"' 2 ° and "one of the greatest
securities of the lives, liberties and estates of the people.' 12' Ac-
cordingly, the Supreme Court has held that the Constitutional jury
trial provisions "reflect a fundamental decision about the exercise
of official power-a reluctance to entrust plenary powers over the
life and liberty of the citizen to one judge or to a group of
judges."'122 Juries represent the practical manifestation of the
Framers' fundamental commitment to "community participation in
the determination of guilt or innocence.' 123
Ideally, the right to jury trial should attach in "all criminal prose-
cutions.' 24 Due to limited judicial resources, however, the Court
has carved out an exception to the Sixth Amendment's broad guar-
antee. Focusing on the consequences to the defendant, the Court
has excepted those offenses punishable by less than six months' im-
prisonment from the requirement of trial by jury. The petty of-
fense exception is predicated on achieving an appropriate balance
between two competing goals: to protect individuals from govern-
ment oppression and to efficiently allocate limited judicial time and
resources. Because the Sixth Amendment is fundamentally
designed to protect individuals from overbroad government power,
the right to jury trial is properly determined with regard to the po-
tential effects of conviction facing an accused.
A. Problems with the Individual Penalty Approach
The individual penalty approach advanced by the Second Circuit
is flawed because it does not properly determine criminal serious-
118. See Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 155 (1968); Baldwin v. New York, 399
U.S. 66, 72 (1970).
119. Kaye, supra note 2, at 262 (quoting N.J. CONST. § 22 (1776)); See also Duncan,
391 U.S. at 156.
120. Kaye, supra note 2, at 262 (quoting MASS. DECLARATION OF RIGHTS Art. XV
(1780); N.C. DECLARATION OF RIGHTS § 14 (1776); N.H..BILL OF RIGHTS Art. 20
(1784); VA. DECLARATION OF RIGHTS § 11 (1776)).
121. Id. (citing DEL. DECLARATION OF RIGHTS § 13 (1776); MD. DECLARATION OF
RIGHTS § 18 (1776)).
122. Duncan, 391 U.S. at 156.
123. Id.
124. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
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ness with regard to the consequences facing an accused. The ap-
proach fails to account for the circumstance where a court has the
power to impose either concurrent or consecutive sentences for a
given offense. Under 18 U.S.C. § 3584(a), a court can sentence
petty offenders to concurrent terms of imprisonment to be served
simultaneously. The imposition of two concurrent six-month
sentences would result in a six-month prison term. A court can
also impose consecutive terms under § 3584(a) that, in the same
example, would result in twelve months' imprisonment. It is inap-
propriate for a court to deny a jury trial based on a judge's actual
imposition of concurrent sentences 25 rather than the potential for
consecutive sentences because the Supreme Court has mandated
that courts determine seriousness according to ex ante objective cri-
teria. By granting courts the power to sentence a defendant to con-
secutive sentences totaling more than six months when imposing
multiple terms of imprisonment at the same time, Congress re-
vealed with certainty that the commission of several offenses is
more serious than the commission of a single crime. "Only if
§ 3584(a) forbade consecutive sentences would the Second Cir-
cuit's reading of the statute be justified.' 1 26 When a court evalu-
ates seriousness based on the fact that consecutive sentences were
not imposed when they were in fact possible, that court fails to
accurately reflect the legislature's and thus society's view of a crim-
inal act.
The Second Circuit in Lewis concluded that because 18 U.S.C.
§ 3584(a) presumes concurrent sentencing, it reflects Congress's
judgment that the commission of two separate offenses, arising
from the same incident, is no more serious than the commission of
a single offense.127 This analysis simply ignores a judge's power to
impose consecutive terms of imprisonment. Under the applicable
125. See United States v. O'Connor, 660 F.Supp. 955, 955 (N.D. Ga. 1987) (holding
two petty offenses tried together to be a serious offense based on the magistrate's
authority to impose consecutive sentences pursuant to § 3584(a), exposing the defend-
ant to a potential penalty of one year's imprisonment).
126. United States v. Lewis, Cert. Petition at 8, 65 F.3d 252 (2d Cir. 1995), cert.
granted, 116 S.Ct. 807 (Jan. 19, 1996). Likewise, looking to the actual imposition of
consecutive sentences is an improper method for determining criminal seriousness.
The Ninth Circuit has noted that the imposition of consecutive sentences in excess of
six months for conviction of multiple petty offenses accorded a defendant the right to
trial by jury. Rife v. Godbehere, 814 F.2d 563, 565 (9th Cir. 1987). This analysis is
flawed because it is only relevant that the possibility of consecutive sentencing exists
and that more than six months' imprisonment is at stake. The penalty actually im-
posed should play no part in the analysis. See supra notes 97-105 and accompanying
text.
127. Lewis, 65 F.3d at 255.
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statute, the defendant in Lewis faced the possibility of twelve
months in jail. That the judge decided not to impose the maximum
term is irrelevant to the determination of whether the charged of-
fenses were "serious."
Likewise, the defendant in Bencheck faced a potential two years'
imprisonment because that consecutive sentencing was author-
ized. l2 8 The Bencheck court reasoned that the possibility of con-
secutive sentencing was irrelevant because the government was not
"corrupt or overzealous' 1 29 in charging the defendant and the trial
court had promised not to sentence the defendant to more than six
months' imprisonment. 130 The Bencheck court substituted a sub-
jective standard for the objective standard mandated by Supreme
Court precedent for assessing criminal seriousness.1
3
'
The individual penalty approach is further flawed because it is
inherently susceptible to prosecutorial abuse. 132  Specifically, a
prosecutor can break down a serious offense into multiple petty
charges for the explicit purpose of obliterating a defendant's right
to jury trial. For example, rather than charging a defendant with
larceny, a serious offense, based on allegations of stealing repeat-
edly from the same person, a prosecutor can charge the defendant
with multiple petty theft counts. By breaking down a criminal inci-
dent into separate petty offenses, a prosecutor is able to threaten
the defendant with over six months in prison, yet avoid jury trial.
The government should not be able to circumvent the require-
ments of the Sixth Amendment merely by manipulating the crimi-
nal statutes. 133
128. United States v. Bencheck, 926 F.2d 1512, 1514 (10th Cir. 1991).
129. Id at 1519 (citing Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 156 (1968).
130. Id
131. Larson, supra note 11, at 775.
132. The Supreme Court has recognized, on many occasions, that the jury trial right
was intended to guard against excessive prosecutorial power. See, e.g., Duncan, 391
U.S. at 156 (noting that
[p]roviding an accused with the right to be tried by a jury of his peers gave
him an inestimable safeguard against the corrupt or overzealous prosecutor
and against the compliant, biased, or eccentric judge"); Baldwin v. New
York, 399 U.S. 66, 72 (1970) (noting that "the primary purpose of the jury is
to prevent the possibility of oppression by the Government; the jury inter-
poses between the accused and his accuser the judgment of laymen who are
less tutored perhaps than a judge or panel of judges, but who at the same
time are less likely to function or appear as but another arm of the Govern-
ment that has proceeded against him").
133.. The Fourth Circuit correctly observed that "modem criminal codes permit
multiple charges to flow from a single discrete act of criminality .... ." United States v.
Coppins, 953 F.2d 86, 90 (citing Haar v. Hanrahan, 708 F.2d 1547, 1551 (10th Cir.
1983).
1996]
FORDHAM URBAN LAW JOURNAL [Vol. XXIII
B. Problems with Pre-trial Sentencing Stipulations
Because the Supreme Court has directed courts to assess poten-
tial statutory penalties, as opposed to actual sentences, in determin-
ing seriousness, a judge's pre-trial sentencing stipulation is an
improper basis for a determination of jury trial entitlement. 3 4
Such an arrangement fails to reflect the objective societal judgment
of an offense's seriousness.
The Supreme Court has had several opportunities to endorse ju-
dicially imposed penalties as proper gauges of criminal seriousness
but has never done so. 135 Instead, the Court has favored other
measures, the modern one being legislative penalties. 36  The
Court has held that "doubts must be resolved . . . by objective
standards such as may be observed in the laws and practices of the
community taken as a gauge of its social and ethical judgments.' 37
Further, the Court has reasoned that legislative penalties best mea-
sure criminal seriousness because they are the most "objective cri-
teria reflecting the seriousness with which society regards the
offense.' 38 Moreover, the Court has indicated that the legislature
is the proper body to determine these community judgments. "The
judiciary should not substitute its judgment as to seriousness for
that of a legislature, which is 'far better equipped to perform the
task, and [is] likewise more responsive to changes in attitude and
134. Blanton v. City of North Las Vegas, 489 U.S. 538 (1989); Baldwin v. New
York, 399 U.S. 66 (1970); Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968); District of Co-
lumbia v. Clawans, 300 U.S. 617 (1937).
135. See, e.g., Duncan, 391 U.S. 145 (1968) (establishing authorized legislative pen-
alties as the best indicator of criminal seriousness); Clawans, 300 U.S. 617 (1937)
(holding that the legislative penalty at issue expressed a social judgment of the seri-
ousness of the offense); Schick v. United States, 195 U.S. 65 (1904) (looking to the
moral nature of an offense to determine its level of seriousness); Callan v. Wilson, 127
U.S. 540 (1888) (determining seriousness based on common law indictability as op-
posed to a judicially imposed sentence). See supra part I.A.
136. See supra part I.B.
137. See, e.g., Duncan, 391 U.S. at 160 (quoting Clawans, 300 U.S. at 628) (noting
that "[t]he penalty authorized by the law of the locality may be taken 'as a gauge of its
social and ethical judgments' " of the offense in question). See also United States v.
Craner, 652 F.2d 23, 24 (9th Cir. 1981) (concluding that "[an offense is not 'serious'
because it is severely punished; it is severely punished because it is 'serious.' The
severity of prescribed sanctions is regarded as the best objective indication of the
general normative judgment of the seriousness of an offense.").
138. Baldwin, 399 U.S. at 68 (citing Clawans, 300 U.S. at 628). The Court adopted
an approach of the future Justice Frankfurter which evaluated jury trial entitlement
primarily on the basis of the opprobrium with which society views the offense, as
measured in part by the potential legislatively authorized penalty. See Frankfurter &
Corcoran, supra note 2 at 980-81.
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more amenable to the recognition and correction of their mis-
perceptions in this respect.' "139
Because the Sixth Amendment is primarily a tool to protect indi-
viduals, criminal seriousness for purposes of jury trial entitlement
is properly determined by reference to the consequences facing a
defendant. Measurement of criminal seriousness by judicially re-
duced sentences underestimates the gravity of the consequences
facing an accused. 140 But even if we consider the concept from the
prosecutor's perspective, joined offenses are more serious than
non-joined offenses. It can be argued that joinder evinces a height-
ened prosecutorial desire to dispose of a case. At the least, both
joinder and severance show special prosecutorial interest. Such
procedural decisions often reflect the government's position that a
criminal incident is particularly interesting and worthy of special
attention to ensure conviction.
Conviction of multiple charges could result in a lengthy prison
sentence and its attendant social stigma. But there are other fun-
damental indications that a multiple petty offense prosecution is
serious as well. Indeed, the very reasons why prosecutors choose
to bring charges together reveal that multiple petty offenses tried
together are more serious than each individual offense tried alone.
The government's decision to join charges indicates that some-
thing more than prison time is involved. The prosecutor's decision
to join is based on a desire to enhance criminal seriousness. As a
practical matter, the defendant is forced to fight on more fronts at
once. The typical petty offense defendant will have scant resources
to adequately defend himself against a lengthy, complicated charg-
ing instrument. Conceivably, this is the very type of oppression the
Framers feared.
Notwithstanding that pre-trial sentencing stipulations are im-
proper, the government's willingness to commit to such an arrange-
ment reflects a prosecutorial belief that the offenses are serious.
The decision to stipulate a sentence reflects the magnitude of a
prosecutor's desire to convict. If a prosecutor is willing to bargain,
it is likely that he regards a criminal incident as serious because he
wants a conviction even at the sacrifice of his ability to ask for the
maximum authorized penalty. That the government is willing to
agree to a maximum sentence before trial illustrates that multiple
139. Blanton v. City of North Las Vegas, 489 U.S. 538, 541-42 (1989) (quoting Lan-
dry v. Hoepfner, 840 F.2d 1201, 1209 (5th Cir. 1988)(en banc) cert. denied, 840 F.2d
1201 (1989)).
140. Larson, supra note 11, at 775.
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misdemeanors tried together are different from and regarded as
more serious than each misdemeanor tried individually.
Furthermore, a prosecutor may also join multiple petty charges
in order to bring evidence of other offenses before the decision
maker in an attempt to influence that judge or jury's decision. By
virtue of their multiplicity, charges brought together influence a
decision maker to take a case more seriously. In fact, one empiri-
cal study revealed that joining charges within a realistic trial setting
actually increases the likelihood of conviction. 141
C. Simple Aggregation: A Transactional Approach to Jury
Entitlement
In Baldwin, the Supreme Court interpreted the Constitution to
guarantee the right to jury trial when "what is at stake is the depri-
vation of individual liberty for a period exceeding six months."' 142
This emphasis on the consequences facing a defendant is consistent
with the Sixth Amendment's fundamental purpose of protecting
defendants from the possibility of oppression by the government.
Six months' incarceration is the benchmark standard for determin-
ing whether an individual offense is serious.143 In circumstances
where multiple offenses arising out of the same incident are tried
together, however, legislators have not spoken as to whether the
incident itself is serious; they have merely expressed their percep-
tion of seriousness with regard to each individual criminal offense.
Because the Supreme Court interprets criminal seriousness in
terms of "stakes,"'144 lower courts must approach jury entitlement
on that basis as well. Thus, if the maximum penalty in the prosecu-
tion of related criminal acts threatens a defendant's individual lib-
erty for more than six months, that defendant has a fundamental
right to jury trial.
A defendant suffers a Sixth Amendment violation when con-
victed without a jury, not because the legislature did not intend
similar offenses to be tried together, but because only juries should
send people to prison for terms beyond six months. It is notewor-
thy that the plain language of the Sixth Amendment guaranteesjury trial to criminal "prosecutions," rather than individual criminal
141. See Sarah Tanford, Decision Making Processes in Joined Criminal Trials, 12
CRIMINAL JUSTICE AND BEHAVIOR 367 (1985) (explaining the results of a study which
indicated that "a defendant was more likely to be convicted on a particular charge in a
joined trial than on the same charges tried by itself").





"offenses."' 45 Blanton directs courts to assess seriousness accord-
ing to maximum authorized legislative penalties to ensure that no
defendant is convicted without a jury for an offense punishable by
more than six months' incarceration. The individual penalty ap-
proach runs contrary to this goal by allowing a defendant to face
multiple "petty" charges, with "serious" criminal sanctions, without
the constitutional protection of a jury trial.
Although the text of the Constitution appears to guarantee jury
trial to all criminal defendants, the petty offense doctrine is an ex-
ception, primarily designed to conserve judicial resources. History
shows that the jury trial guarantee has always excluded some of-
fenses for other reasons such as lack of common law indictability or
a low degree of moral offensiveness. 146 To properly apply the petty
offense exception, courts must balance the need to protect defend-
ants from oppressive prosecutions with the goal of conserving judi-
cial resources.
Indeed, a system allowing for aggregation of penalties for crimi-
nal acts that are completely unrelated would be unmanageable.
But simple aggregation does not require that courts grant a jury
trial in every single case where a defendant is charged with multi-
ple petty offenses. Courts employing the simple aggregation
method have clearly guarded against this potential threat to judi-
cial economy. Virtually every court that has granted jury trial
based on the aggregation of maximum penalties for multiple petty
offenses has specifically noted that the charges all arose from a sin-
gle act, transaction or occurrence. 4 7
145. Brief for Petitioner at 5, United States v. Lewis, 65 F.3d 252 (2d Cir. 1995),
cert. granted, 116 S.Ct. 807 (Jan. 19, 1996).
146. See supra part I.A.
147. A prime example is the seminal aggregation case, United States v. Potvin, 481
F.2d 380 (10th Cir. 1973), which concerned the joint prosecution of separate petty
charges stemming from multiple related acts. The Tenth Circuit granted a jury trial
because the charges arose from the same "act, transaction, or occurrence" and the
aggregate maximum term of incarceration exceeded six months. Id at 382. In Potvin,
the government charged the defendants in a two count indictment with cutting and
chopping timber, and commencing to build a structure on public lands, without the
necessary permit or approval. Id. According to the record, the defendants first com-
mitted the act of making an illegal settlement, and later committed the act of cutting
timber and commencing to build a structure. Id. The court found these events to be
sufficiently related to constitute one criminal incident and warrant aggregation of the
offenses' penalties. See also United States v. FMC Corp., 428 F. Supp. 615 (1977),
aff'd, 572 F.2d 902 (1978); United States v. Musgrave, 695 F. Supp. 231 (W.D.Va.
1988). Joinder of claims rules provide guidance to courts in these situations. See FED.
RULE CRIM. P. 8, and infra note 148 and accompanying text.
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The principles of joinder provide guidance to courts for drawing
proper lines as to which offenses' penalties should be aggregated
because they reflect society's judgment that charges flowing from
the same act, transaction or occurrence are so closely related that
they should be considered together. For example, Rule 8(a) of the
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure allows for the joinder of
counts in one indictment when they are "of the same or similar
character or based on the same act or transaction or on two or
more acts or transactions connected together or constituting parts
of a common scheme or plan.' 148 When a prosecutor claims that
two or more acts are similar enough to join and a trial court agrees,
both evince a belief that although the defendant has committed
several distinct offenses, a court should consider these separate en-
tities together. Accordingly, in these cases, a court should deter-
mine seriousness based on the entire criminal episode. 149 It is
illogical to consider charges as closely related for the purposes of
trial but as unrelated offenses for the purposes of determining the
seriousness of the punishment. 150
148. FED. R. CRIM. P. 8(a).
149. The Fourth and the Tenth Circuits have employed this approach. See supra
Part II.C.
150. Critics of simple aggregation point out that it only triggers the right to jury
trial for those sets of offenses that have been joined for trial, resulting in unfair treat-
ment for those defendants whose charges have not been joined. In the case where
related charges are severed, however, courts can police oppressive prosecutions. One
solution is compulsory joinder. Courts should require joinder when the defendant can
show that the charges have been severed in bad faith. When the prosecution opts to
try related charges separately, and the defendant faces a serious aggregate sentence,
that defendant should have the opportunity to invoke the aggregation principle by
petitioning the court that his charges be joined for trial. Under this approach, the
defendant would have the burden of proving that the charges against him were sev-
ered in bad faith. The defendant could then make a motion to join charges by arguing
that the prosecution severed the charges for the explicit purpose of avoiding trial by
jury in the hope of making a conviction more likely.
The ABA Model Code suggests that a defendant prosecuted in separate trials be
allowed to make a timely motion for joinder of offenses. See MODEL PENAL CODE
§ 1.3. Under this approach, the motion should be granted "unless the court deter-
mines that because the prosecuting attorney does not have sufficient evidence to war-
rant trying some of the offenses at that time, or for some other reason, the ends of
justice would be defeated if the motion were granted." ABA Project on Standards for
Criminal Justice, Standards Relating to Joinder and Severance at 18 (1968). The pur-
pose of the section is to protect defendants from "successive prosecutions based upon
essentially the same conduct, whether the purpose in so doing is to hedge against the
risk of an unsympathetic jury at the first trial, to place a 'hold' on a person after he
has been sentenced to imprisonment, or to simply harass by multiplicity of trials." Id.
at 19 (quoting MODEL PENAL CODE § 1.08, Comment (Tent. Draft No. 5 1956)). To
further this goal, the Model Penal Code provides that in such a case the court should
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It can also be argued that simple aggregation might encourage
prosecutors to sever related charges to avoid conducting a jury
trial. That risk, however, is minimal. Practical concerns guard
against the possibility of prosecutors employing such a strategy.
The Supreme Court has noted in the double jeopardy context that
"the Government must be deterred from abusive, repeated prose-
cutions of a single offender for similar offenses by the sheer press
of other demands upon prosecutorial and judicial resources. "151
Critics of simple aggregation also claim that if legislators re-
garded multiple offenses arising from the same incident to be more
serious than each individual offense, they would create statutory
categories of offenses to reflect this belief.152 Legislatures indeed
have indirectly accounted for "some situations' 15 3 where sets of re-
lated offenses are more serious than each individual offense consid-
ered alone. For example, the legislature determined that the act of
killing while committing a felony is more serious than either act
alone. Thus, it created the offense of felony murder which pro-
vides for harsher sentencing. One critic has asserted, that "[s]ince
legislatures do respond to community preferences in some cases by
fashioning 'serious' penalties for multiple petty offenses, courts
should assume that legislatures are also responding to community
preferences when they decline to create 'serious' penalties for
other sets of offenses.' '1
54
Certain combinations of offenses are indeed more serious than
those same offenses committed separately. For example, driving
have the authority to join charges or order separate trials, on the prosecuting attor-
ney's or the defendant's application.
A defendant shall not be subject to separate trials for multiple offenses
based on the same conduct or arising from the same criminal episode if such
offenses are known to the appropriate prosecuting officer at the time of the
commencement of the first trial and are within the jurisdiction of a single
court.
MODEL PENAL CODE § 1.3(2). At least one circuit court has suggested an analogous
standard for protecting defendants from oppressive prosecutions. See United States v.
Bencheck, 926 F.2d 1512, 1519 (10th Cir. 1989) (proposing that a court should grant a
jury trial "where the defendant demonstrates to the trial judge that there is a reason-
able probability the state is undertaking the prosecution of the petty charge, or
charges, out of spite or vindictiveness" and predicting that "it will be obvious to the
trial judge when the state is acting from a motive driven by the constitutionally imper-
missible desire to oppress the defendant"). Even if the Court rejects the notion of
compulsory joinder, as it has in the past, the likelihood of this becoming a serious risk
is minimal. See infra note 152 and accompanying text.
151. United States v. Dixon, - U.S. -, 113 S.Ct. 2849, 2863 at n.15 (1993).
152. See Butler, supra note 5, at 887.
153. Id.
154. Id. at 894.
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through a red light while speeding is arguably more serious than
either running a red light or speeding alone because the risk of
harm to the community is heightened. However, the permutations
of petty offenses are endless. Thus, creating new categories of of-
fenses to account for every instance in which two or more related
offenses are more serious together than each is alone is entirely
impracticable. Courts must interpret legislative approximations of
seriousness in the next best way.
Reference to the maximum aggregated penalty provides the best
available estimate of society's view concerning related petty of-
fenses joined for trial. "If a set of petty offenses, considered as a
whole, generally is more serious than any one of the offenses mak-
ing up the set, the aggregate penalty approach [simple aggrega-
tion], though imperfect, may be the best available method for
estimating the difference between the seriousness of an individual
petty offense and the seriousness of a set of petty offenses.' l 5 Be-
cause it is the best way to discern seriousness for related petty of-
fenses, courts must employ the simple aggregation method to
accurately comply with the Sixth Amendment.
Conclusion
The success of the petty offense exception depends on striking an
appropriate balance between two competing goals: the reasonable
allocation of judicial resources and the protection of individuals
from government oppression. Because the individual penalty ap-
proach subverts the Supreme Court's mandate to evaluate criminal
seriousness based on objective penalties, it fails to adequately pro-
tect defendants charged with multiple petty offenses. The limited
aggregation method also fails by placing arbitrary power in the
hands of the judiciary-a result the Framers sought to avoid. Sim-
ple aggregation, however, complies with Supreme Court precedent
by granting the right to jury trial to defendants who face over six
months' imprisonment. In the case of related petty offenses, only
simple aggregation properly fulfills the Sixth Amendment's funda-
mental purpose: to protect individuals from government
oppression.
155. Id. at 890.
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